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Intraday Rallies and Crashes: Spillovers of Trading Halts
Abstract
This paper analyses a set of intraday rally and crash events at the firm level during the single
stock circuit breaker (SSCB) program, and documents the cross-sectional spillover effects of
such events on non-halted stocks. We test whether such major price jumps, and subsequent
trading halts, affect related stocks through the destabilizing arbitrage channel. We find that
extreme price movements that trigger the circuit breakers at the firm level are accompanied
by a massive surge in volume, spread and short-term volatility, which gradually revert back
to normal. Speculative strategies of arbitrageurs such as momentum and pairs trading cause
cross-sectional spillovers in volume and volatility during the trading halt.
(J.E.L Classification: G12, G14, G18, G28)
Keywords: circuit breakers, trading halts, arbitrage, momentum, pairs trading.
1 Introduction
Modern trading environment which largely benefits from the advances in technology is also
more exposed to technical problems associated with automated trading. At the same time,
security prices react much faster to news thanks to the speed technology. Hence it is not
uncommon to see market disruptions by extreme intraday price movements. On 8 July 2015,
NYSE stopped trading due to an internal technical issue, similar to the Nasdaq halt in 2013.1
Both U.S. equity (2010) and treasury markets (2014) have experienced flash crashes, that is,
abrupt intraday price movements with a fast recovery. Such intraday events raise concerns
about the correct policy response to avoid potentially adverse effects of intraday trading
turmoil on market stability.
As one of the policy measures to prevent market disruptions, market-wide circuit break-
ers have been in place since the October 1987 crash (Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2004; Goldstein,
2015). Circuit breakers aim at temporarily suspending trading under extreme market con-
ditions to prevent excessive intraday price fluctuations. On the unusual turbulent day, the
Flash Crash, 6 May 2010, the existing market-wide circuit breaker failed to stop sharp price
downturn of individual stocks. Following the Flash Crash, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) launched a new single stock circuit breaker rule (SSCB, hereafter). The
rule stipulates that stocks whose price moves 10 percent or more in a five-minute window
should be halted for a five-minute period.2 The trading suspension can be triggered either
be a large discrete price jump or a cumulative price change over the five-minute window.
Our first contribution is a detailed analysis of such intraday events at the firm level. We
look into 54 SSCB events that involve only S&P 500 or Russell 1000 firms, and take place
during the period between June 2010 and April 2013. Unlike the earlier studies that focus
1There are other examples from the international markets. For instance, trading on the Mumbai stock
exchange, BSE, stopped several hours on 3 July 2014. Similarly, trading on the Phillippine Stock Exchange
(PSE) halted on several days in August 2015. On 7 January 2016, Chinese stock market halted in the
opening minutes due to an automatic circuit breaker.
2The circuit breakers are implemented during the continuous trading hours from 9.45am until 3.35pm.
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on the Flash Crash (e.g., Easley et al., 2011; Kirilenko et al., 2014; Madhavan, 2012), we
filter out a set of intraday rallies and crashes at the firm level that trigger the SSCB. These
events are not caused by market-wide volatility or material news, that is, news released by
the firm that affects the fundamental value, e.g., stock splits or earning announcements.
However, there may be firm-specific non-material news circulating in the financial media,
e.g., merger/buyout talks or rumors regarding a restructuring, that trigger the SSCB. We
first document the trading activity around SSCB events to understand how the trading halts
affect different measures of market quality such as volume, spread and volatility.
Our primary objective is to understand the implication of such intraday extreme price
movements and subsequent trading halts on market stability. Our strategy is to test the cross-
sectional spillover effects of trading halts on other stocks, that is, any effect on the trading
activity of related non-halted stocks.3 In particular, we investigate the speculative activity
of arbitrageurs, as one of the channels for such cross-sectional spillover effects. De Long
et al. (1990) show that in a market with feedback traders, rational speculation may be
destabilizing. In light of the De Long et al. (1990) model, the paper by Lou and Polk
(2013) propose a comomentum measure, that is, an abnormal return correlation among
stocks controlling for Fama-French risk factors, which reflects the speculative activity of
arbitrageurs (Moskowitz et al., 2012). Using their measure, we first identify the set of
candidate stocks that are part of a momentum strategy. Given the lack of a fundamental
anchor (Stein, 2009), such feedback trading is more likely to have a destabilizing effect, that
is, moving prices away from the fundamental value. We question whether such arbitrage
activity has destabilizing effect on market quality beyond price efficiency. We also consider
an anchored arbitrage strategy, namely, pairs trading that exploits the price discrepancy
between historically similar stocks (Gatev et al., 2006; Do and Faff, 2010), as a potential
channel for spillover effects.4 Thus we test how the results on the spillover effects depend on
3Our focus on cross-sectional spillover effects (Brugler and Linton, 2016) is different from the earlier
literature on volatility spillover, that is, the effect of circuit breakers on volatility in subsequent periods (see,
e.g., Abad and Pascual, 2013) .
4We implement two versions of pairs trading: with and without an industry match between the stocks in
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the existence of a price anchor.
Our first observation is that extreme intraday price jumps are temporary, and revert
back quickly in the case of intraday crashes. Earlier studies on the Flash Crash event (e.g.,
Easley et al., 2011; Kirilenko et al., 2014; Madhavan, 2012) document a similar temporary
price effect. However, intraday rallies exhibit persistent price effects if there are firm-specific
news on the day of the SSCB. This result is consistent with the prediction of De Long
et al. (1990) that asset prices overreact to news due to both positive feedback traders and
anticipatory trades of rational speculators.5 We also observe that circuit breakers are trig-
gered by abnormal trading activity, that is, activity compared to a 30-day benchmark, in
particular high trading volume and volatility along with increased spread just before the
trading halt. If there is news associated with the firm on the SSCB day, the abnormal trad-
ing activity already starts five minutes before the trading halt. After trading resumes, the
abnormal trading activity reverts back to its normal level in about 20 minutes only if there
are no news. The changes persist beyond half an hour in the case of firm-specific news. The
difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) analysis shows that the abnormal trading activity on
the SSCB day is not driven by a common shock to firms with similar characteristics, such
as price, market capitalization or index membership.
Our main contribution is to identify the channel through which the abnormal trading
activity is transmitted to related non-halted stocks during the trading halt. We show that
mainly the firms which are part of a risky arbitrage activity that involve SSCB stocks are
affected by the trading halts. In particular, speculative portfolio strategies such momentum
trading or pairs trading cause trading externalities during extreme market conditions. The
former strategy bets on the price trend of a group of stocks, that is, winner stocks with a
better past return performance, while the latter places speculative bets on the price con-
vergence between stocks with similar past price paths. The diff-in-diff analysis reveals that
the pair. The former strategy is restricted to stocks within the same industry.
5In a recent paper, Fishe et al. (2015) show the existence of anticipatory traders in the market who detect
the local price trends before the other traders.
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the SSCB trading halts cause abnormal volume and short-term volatility spillovers for these
non-halted stocks in the arbitrage portfolio. To the best of our knowledge, none of the ear-
lier papers investigate the implication of such arbitrage strategies on liquidity and volatility
transmission across stocks.
There is some theoretical literature that analyzes the role of circuit breakers on market
quality. According to the models, circuit breakers may serve as safeguards by providing
a cooling-off period that allows extra time to reassess trading decisions (Ma et al., 1989),
reduce transactional risk (Greenwald and Stein, 1991), and lower information asymmetry in
the presence of information frictions (Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, 2000). If traders incur
adverse selection costs, then introducing circuit breakers might be beneficial for market
participants by reducing volatility while increasing trading volume. However, circuit breakers
might also have an adverse effect on volatility. According to the Subrahmanyam (1994)’s
model, large liquidity traders might anticipate trading halts, and rush to trade to satisfy
their trading needs, and hence cause the so-called magnet effect.
Earlier empirical studies show that rule-based trading halts, such as the SSCBs intro-
duced by the SEC, affect market activity, and result in high trading volume without reducing
volatility (Abad and Pascual, 2010; Ferris et al., 1992; Martens and Steenbeek, 2001). How-
ever, consistent with the Subrahmanyam (1994)’s model, Lee et al. (1994) find that both
volume and volatility significantly increase in a matched sample analysis around discretionary
suspensions.6 On the other hand, Lehmann (1989) and Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) show
evidence in favor of the magnet effect. In our SSCB setting, where the trading halts are not
triggered by material information released by the firm, information asymmetry is unlikely
to play a major role, instead the speculative activity of arbitrageurs would generate higher
volume and an adverse effect on volatility on SSCB days.
There is less theoretical guidance on the spillover effects of circuit breakers on other
related stocks. Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2000) propose a model in the context of in-
6Subrahmanyam (1995) compares discretionary vs. rule-based (automatic) trading suspensions.
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formation disclosure, and conjecture spillover effects on firms in the same industry. The
model developed by Cespa and Foucault (2014) propose that (il)liquidity can be contagious
across assets through a multiplier mechanism: the price of one security is a noisy signal
for traders in other securities, so if a price shock to one security changes the view or risk
appetite of traders on other securities, this information learning process will yield a similar
return pattern. However, neither of the models are directly applicable to the SSCBs.
Jiang et al. (2009) find that trading halts cause a liquidity impact on informationally
related stocks, which are identified as the stocks in the same four-digit SIC industry. We
deviate from the earlier literature which focuses on the information channel for the spillover
effects. In light of the De Long et al. (1990) and Stein (2009) models, we use the identifi-
cation strategy suggested by Lou and Polk (2013) and Gatev et al. (2006) to collect a set
of stocks that are part of an unanchored and anchored arbitrage strategy, respectively. In
the absence of asymmetric information, we would expect increased volume and volatility
of non-halted stocks through the speculative activity of arbitrageurs, without a significant
change in spreads. Thus, we test whether there are liquidity and volatility spillovers across
securities through the risky arbitrage channel during the trading halts triggered by intraday
rallies and crashes. The recent finding by Goldstein (2015), that NYSE’s Rule 80A is effec-
tive in reducing volatility spillover to the cash market from the futures market, hints at the
importance of the arbitrage channel in the context of circuit breakers.7
In a concurrent working paper, Brogaard and Roshak (2015) test the ex-ante effects
of price limits during the same SSCB period, and find evidence on less aggressive trading
of informed market participants supporting the holding back hypothesis proposed by Sub-
rahmanyam (1997). Our focus is different, since we study the intraday events caused by
non-material information where informed trading is less likely to be the primary channel. In
another recent working paper, Brugler and Linton (2016) study the cross-sectional spillover
7Rule 80A, a market-wide circuit breaker involving trades of S&P 500 constituents, limits index arbi-
trage traders’ ability to post directional orders following large price changes in the market index to avoid
destabilizing effects across markets.
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effects of circuit breakers implemented on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). However, they
mainly focus on the hedging motive proxied by market-wide shocks as the main channel for
the spillover effect, while market-wide information plays no role in our setting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we describe the
data and explain our identification strategy. In Section III, we provide empirical results on
abnormal trading activity of SSCB stocks. We show evidence on non-halted stocks in Section
IV. In Section V, we conclude.
2 Data
In this section we first explain the details of our data collection to construct the set of
SSCB events. Next, we discuss the identification of related non-halted stocks for each SSCB
event.
2.1 SSCB Events
We obtain data from various data sources: intraday trades and quotes data are from
the daily TAQ dataset via WRDS. We also collect company information from the CRSP
daily stock files. After the Flash Crash on 6 May 2010, the SEC introduced the single stock
circuit breaker (SSCB) program in three phases: Phase I (11 Jun 2010 - 13 Sept 2010) which
applies only to S&P 500 stocks, Phase II (14 Sept 2010 - 7 Aug 2011) which also includes
Russell 1000 firms, and Phase III (8 Aug 2011 - 8 April2013) until the start of the Limit up
limit down (LULD) regulation.8 The last phase included all NMS stocks (see Figure 1). In
our main analysis we focus only on the most liquid S&P 500 and Russell 1000 firms.9 To
identify SSCB stocks, we use an algorithm that checks both the trade resumption condition,
8Under the LULD mechanism, individual stocks are halted only if a trade occurs outside the price band
which is set dynamically. Under the new regulation, the number of halts is reduced substantially, except
the day, 24 Aug 2015, when there were 1,278 trading halts for 471 different ETFs and stocks (CNBC, 2015,
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/25/what-happened-during-the-aug-24-flash-crash.html).
9For the less liquid NMS stocks traded above (below) $1, the halt was triggered after a 30 (50) percent
price jump.
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the duration of the halt, and the size of the price jump preceding the halt. We filter out
quotes with special conditions, that is, quote mode different than 11. We cross-validate each
SSCB event collecting firm-specific news from the Factiva database. We limit our sample
to common stocks (share code 10 and 11) with only a single halt in a day, and trading at a
price higher than $1 on the SSCB day.
We apply several filters to make sure that the trading is not halted via another type
of circuit breaker, for example, circuit breaker triggered by order imbalance (mode code=7)
or pending news (mode code=11). We excluded all the events with a scheduled company
announcement, SEC filings, initial public offerings, stock splits or reverse splits. We create
a dummy variable to control for the non-material news on the day of the SSCB, that is,
any unexpected news or rumor that might trigger the trading halt. Our final SSCB sample
consists of 54 trading halts on NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges during the period between
16 June 2010 and 27 March 2013.10 As Appendix Table A.1 shows, the sample includes
several well-known companies such Washington Post, Citigroup, Adobe, Apple, Dell, Visa,
Mastercard and others. In Appendix Table A.2, which describes SSCB event details, we
report the ratio of the VIX index on the day of the SSCB relative to the average index level
in the SSCB month. On average, this ratio is not statistically different from one, suggesting
that SSCB events are ideosyncratic events, and not triggered by market-wide shocks.11
2.2 Identification
In this section we explain our identification strategy to construct a set of candidate stocks
which are related to the SSCB stocks through the arbitrage channel. In particular, we
consider two types of arbitrage strategies: i) momentum (feedback) trading initiated by
rational speculators, an unanchored strategy (De Long et al., 1990; Stein, 2009)12, and ii)
10See Appendix Table A.1 and Table A.2 for SSCB stock and event details.
11There is only one case with two correlated SSCBs: both Visa and Mastercard experience the trading
halt on the same day. Our Factiva news search shows that the SSCBs are related to the Fed’s proposal of
debit card fee raise.
12According to Nanex research available at http://www.nanex.net/aqck/2950.html, momentum ignition
events triggered by predatory high frequency traders are ubiquitous in the recent period.
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pairs trading which is based on exploiting the deviations from the relative-value arbitrage
rule, an anchored strategy (Gatev et al., 2006; Do and Faff, 2010).
2.2.1 Momentum stocks
This section describes how we define momentum stocks for each SSCB stock that was
halted during the SEC pilot period. Our aim is to measure the effect of firm level intra-
day rally and crash events on other stocks that are related to halted stocks through the
destabilizing arbitrage activity. First, we focus on a portfolio strategy which relies on past
performance of stocks: stocks are sorted based on their past returns over a formation period,
then past winners are bought and past losers are shorted (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).
This strategy involves risks since the investor places a bet on the continuation of a price
trend.
We identify momentum stocks based on the degree of abnormal return correlation with
SSCB stocks (Lou and Polk, 2013). This methodology allows us to capture the connection
between the SSCB stocks and other related stocks which arbitrageurs are likely to consider
as part of a momentum trading strategy in the absence of a fundamental anchor, that is,
a clear valuation benchmark. Following Lou and Polk (2013) we find canditate momentum
stocks that have abnormal return correlation with the SSCB stocks after controlling for the
three Fama-French risk factors:
partialCorr(reti, ret−i|mkt, smb, hml) (1)
where reti is the daily return of stock i in our 54 SSCB sample, ret−i is the daily return of
any S&P500 or Russell 1000 common stock (with a price greater than $1) except for stock
i , mkt is the market factor, that is, the excess return on the broad market index, smb is the
size factor, that is, the return on the small market cap minus the large market cap stocks,
and hml is the value factor, that is, the return on the stocks with high book-to-market ratio
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minus the return on the stocks with low book-to-market ratio. We obtain residuals of the
previous six-month daily return after controlling for the three Fama-French risk factors, and
then calculate the pairwise partial correlations between the residuals of the halted SSCB
stock and other eligible stocks. The stocks with a significant partial return correlation (at
the 1% level) with a halted SSCB stock are identified as momentum stocks. We select the
five strongest candidates with the highest (absolute) partial correlation, for each SSCB stock,
to create a balanced panel of 270 momentum stocks. We report the results of the balanced
panel in the main analysis to compare different arbitrage strategies.
2.2.2 Pairs trading stocks
Pairs trading is a simple statistical arbitrage strategy that involves identifying stocks with
similar price paths and a bet on the convergence of the prices whenever they drift apart. The
price of the other stock in the pair provides a tangible price anchor. Such an anchored strat-
egy based on relative pricing may improve price efficiency due to law of one price, assuming
that both stocks in the pair are close substitutes. Yet, this strategy clearly involves risks as
well since pairs are identified based on the historical data and on the implicit assumption
that the relative price relation will hold in the future.
Using data over forthy years, Gatev et al. (2006) document that pairs trading strategy
is highly profitable, even after taking into account transaction costs, bid-ask bounds and
short-selling costs. Do and Faff (2010) confirm their evidence using a more recent sample
involving the crisis period. Engelberg et al. (2009), on the other hand, show that pairs
trading profitability depends on both ideosyncratic news and liquidity shocks to the stocks
in the pair that trigger the divergence in prices.
We follow Gatev et al. (2006) to find the candidate stocks of a pairs trading strategy
for each SSCB stock. Using a one-year data before each SSCB event, we consider only
those stocks from the CRSP daily files, which have at least one trade each day during the
formation period. Then we compute a cumulative total returns index for each SSCB stock
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over the formation period. We select candidate stocks for each SSCB stock by minimizing a
distance measure between the price paths based on the sum of squared deviations. To form
a balance panel as we did above for the momentum strategy, we choose the top five strongest
candidates with the minimum distance measure relative to each SSCB stock.13 In addition to
the unrestricted search, we also conduct a second search to find potential candidates for the
pairs trading, but this time, considering the 2-digit SIC industry code. This tighter match,
which also captures the industry channel, may potentially yield a stronger transmission
mechanism. However, this industry link is distinct from the information channel considered
in earlier studies (e.g., Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Jiang et al., 2009).
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for SSCB and other related non-halted stocks. In
the table, we report information regarding the non-halted stocks identified via momentum
trading, pairs trading and pairs trading within the same industry. The last column reports
the pooled results across different arbitrage strategies. The number of circuit breakers in
our sample varies across years with a maximum of 26 in 2011. Correspondingly, for each
arbitrage strategy the number of related non-halted stocks changes each year. We categorize
the SSCBs by the direction of the price jump, that is, rally versus crash, and we also
report whether the price jump is discrete or cumulative in the five-minute period before
the trading halt. The majority of the jumps are intraday rallies. Over two third of the
SSCB events are cumulative jumps suggesting that some of these events might be related
to intraday momentum strategies, in particular positive feedback trading, rather than an
abrupt expreme price movement.
[Table 1 about here.]
Based on the Factiva search, we identify 34 SSCB events associated with firm-specific
non-material news. In the last column of Appendix Table A.2, we provide the details of news
13For two SSCB stocks, we cannot find a sufficiently large set of pairs trading stocks.
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information we collected from Factiva. For example, while the news about a merger talk
with Microsoft might have triggred Adobe intraday rally, the news about the failed labor
agreement could be the cause of the AMR Corporation intraday crash, which is the parent
company of American Airlines.14 The remaining 20 SSCB halts are triggered by either a
fat finger trade15, technical problems, e.g., the BATS platform technical issue in the case of
Apple intraday crash, or other unidentified reasons.
There is some dispersion in our sample in terms of price and market capitalization
of SSCB stocks. The average price of the SSCB stocks is $52.90 with an average market
capitalization of $37 billion. Apple stock has the highest share price in our sample, followed
by Washington Post. The top three largest companies are Apple, ExxonMobil and Cisco
systems. The median price of non-halted stocks ($24.98) is similar to the median price
of SSCB stocks ($26.86), while the market capitalization of non-halted stocks is smaller
compared to SSCB stocks.16
3 SSCB stocks
In this section, we explore how the trigger of the circuit breaker at the firm-level affects
the price dynamics, and different aspects of market quality such as volume, liquidity and
volatility of halted securities on the day of the SSCBs.
3.1 Price dynamics
Single stock circuit breakers temporarily suspend trading under extreme price move-
ments. Our first task is to understand how the prices evolve around intraday rallies and
crashes at the firm level. We first look at the speed of adjustment of prices to the pre-halt
14 Since we do not know the exact timing of the news release, we cannot make a causal claim.
15 For example, in the case of Anadarko petroleum which was trading at $38.64 per share prior to the
SSCB, an erroneous trade at $99,999.09 triggered the halt according to Wall Street Journal.
16The main reason for this difference is that, following Gatev et al. (2006) we consider all liquid CRSP
stocks for the pairs trading strategy regardless of the index membership.
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level 20 minutes around the SSCB events. In Figure 2, we plot the average price of each
SSCB stock normalized at the price that prevailed 20 minutes before the trading halt.17
[Figure 2 about here.]
Panel A of Figure 2 shows the price paths of intraday rallies for both news and no news
cases. Our first observation is that, regardless of the related news, prices remain flat with no
significant change until five minutes before the circuit breaker is triggered. Prices build up
relatively slowly few minutes before the halt, in the events with news, resembling feedback
trading activity, while there is an abrupt price jump just before the SSCB trigger in the case
of no news. We note a larger price jump (with a wide confidence interval) if there is no news,
presumably due to fat finger trades or other technical problems. Interestingly, after trading
resumes, prices revert back to normal levels relatively fast, within five minutes, in the events
with no news. However, when there is firm-specific news circulating in the financial media,
prices remain abnormally high in the post-event window. This finding is in line with the
overreaction of prices to news as predicted by the De Long et al. (1990) model.
The picture is different for intraday crashes. The intraday crashes are more similar
to the Flash Crash event studied in other papers (Easley et al., 2011; Kirilenko et al.,
2014; Madhavan, 2012). The prices are not significantly different from the benchmark price
40 minutes around the halt, with a large sudden downward spike right before the halt,
particularly in the case of no news. In the SSCB events with news, prices gradually drop
before the halt and revert back to normal after the halt.18
3.2 Market quality
A policy relevant question is whether the implementation of the single stock circuit breakers
was effective in improving market quality. However, we do not observe the counterfactual,
17We exclude one outlier related to a fat finger trade (Anadarko petroleum) from this part of the analysis.
18We have only six (nine) crash observations with news (no news) associated with the event. Hence, the
confidence bands around the average prices, computed using non-parametric rank test, are relatively wider.
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that is, what would have happened if the trading halt had not been in place. Nevertheless,
it is informative to see how the trading halt affects the course of trading on a SSCB day
compared to other days. We focus on different dimensions of market quality measures such as
trading activity (number of trades, number of quotes, share volume of trades, dollar volume
of trades), liquidity (quoted, relative and effective spread), short-term volatility measured by
(high-low)/high midquotes, and order-to-trade ratio (OTR), a proxy for algorithmic trading
(AT) (Skjeltorp et al., 2013)19, 40 minutes around the SSCB events.20 The quoted spread is
the time-weighted difference between ask and bid prices. Relative spread is the time-weighted
average of the ratio of quoted spread over the prevailing midquote. Finally, effective spread is
a time-weighted average of the ratio of two times the absolute value of the difference between
transaction price and the prevailing midquote over the midquote.
In order to control for intraday effects and firm characteristics, we compute abnormal
market quality measures by taking into account a 30-day average calculated from the same
intraday period 30 days around the SSCB event, excluding the SSCB day. We follow Lee et al.
(1994), Corwin and Lipson (2000) and Christie et al. (2002), and compute the percentage
change of market quality measures relative to the benchmark period as follows:
mqSSCB days −mqbenchmark
mqbenchmark
(2)
In Panel A of Table 2, we test whether market quality measures are significantly different
than the 30-day benchmarks. We note that indeed all the measures are significantly higher
than the normal levels, both in a short five-minute window, and a larger 20-minute window.
One exception is the OTR measure which is significantly lower both before and after the
trading halt (approx. by 32% just before the halt, and by %60 in the five minutes after the
19Skjeltorp et al. (2013) argue that this proxy is highly correlated with HFT activity, identified in studies
with higher quality data using cancellations or HFT flags (e.g., Hendershott et al., 2011; Hasbrouck and
Saar, 2013; Brogaard et al., 2014). Hagstro¨mer and Norden (2013) also show that market making HFTs
have higher OTR compared to other types of HFTs.
20We extended the window up to one hour. The results are very similar, but we lose some observations,
in particular those events which take place early or late in the day.
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halt).21 This preliminary evidence hints at the extraordinary trading conditions on the day
of the SSCB event.
[Table 2 about here.]
Next, we investigate in detail the evolution of three main dimensions of market quality.
Figure 3 illustrates the abnormal (share) volume, relative spread, and volatility for SSCB
stocks. In each panel, we show news and no news cases separately. The total 40-minute
observation window is divided into one-minute increments. For each one-minute interval, we
calculate the abnormal market quality measures, and then take the average across all SSCB
stocks. The vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence bands.
[Figure 3 about here.]
3.2.1 Volume
Panel A of Figure 3 shows that the trading volume is not abnormally high until five
minutes before the trading halt. Volume gradually increases in the last few minutes before
circuit breaker is triggered. In the last minute before the halt, in the SSCB events with news
(no news) trading volume jumps to a 50 (35) times higher level than the 30-day benchmark.
We already notice the difference between news and no news cases when the volume builds
up before the halt, but the differences become especially pronounced once trading resumes.
In the no news cases, volume quickly reverts back to normal levels right after two minutes
after the halt. However, in the news case, the share volume remains at high levels in the first
few minutes after the resumption of trading, and decays gradually afterwards. It stays at
significantly higher levels (compared to no news case) even after 20 minutes of trading. The
causal link between news and trading volume has been long established (e.g., Karpoff, 1986;
Hong and Stein, 2007). Disagreement about the news (Hong and Stein, 2007), differences
21This reduction in OTR could be driven by reduced AT activity due to uncertainty. However, since we
do not have a better proxy for AT or market making HFT activity, we do not explore this further.
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in prior expectations (Karpoff, 1986) or speculative trading due to overreaction to news
(De Long et al., 1990) may explain the elevated trading volume.
3.2.2 Liquidity
Panel B of Figure 3 shows that the relative spread is not abnormally high until the
last two minutes before the trading halt. In fact, it does not change significantly before the
halt in the SSCB events with no news, while it increases almost 75% in the last minute of
trading before halt when there is news. While trading volume either stays at the same level
or reduces after the resumption of the trade, we observe a significant increase in transaction
costs right after the halt, and more pronounced for the SSCB events with news. The trading
remains shallow in the next five minutes with a significant increase in illiquidity. Afterwards,
relative spreads revert back to the normal level in the SSCB events with no news, but spreads
stay at significantly higher levels even 20 minutes after the halt when there is news. Higher
trading volume coupled with increased transactions costs suggest aggressive trading using
market orders to bet on the news. This conjecture is in line with the prediction of the
(De Long et al., 1990) model where feedback traders post market orders based on past price
changes.
3.2.3 Volatility
Panel C of Figure 3 shows that the pattern of short-term volatility is similar to the one
of relative spread before the SSCB trigger: sudden increase in volatility in the last minute
of trading before the halt (though with a much larger magnitude, 20 times the normal level
in the case of news) which remains high after trading resumes. Differently though, volatility
stays at significantly high levels beyond five minutes, both in news and no news cases,
reflecting the uncertainty following the trading halts. This latter finding is in contrast with
the evidence shown Christie et al. (2002) who document reduced post-halt uncertainty due
to information transmission during the halt.
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3.2.4 Matched Sample
In order to see whether the abnormal trading activity on the SSCB day is also documented
in other stocks with similar firm characteristics, we conduct a difference-in-differences (diff-
in-diff) test using a matched sample of stocks that are not subject to the trading halts due to
a SSCB trigger. In particular, following Davies and Kim (2009), we match each SSCB stock
one-to-one to a control stock within the same index, that is, S&P 500 or Russell 1000, based
on the share price and market capitalization.22 The results reported in Panel B of Table 2
are very similar to the results shown in Panel A which are also confirmed by the graphical
evidence provided in Appendix Figure A.1. This suggests that firm characteristics alone,
including the index membership, cannot explain the abnormal activity on SSCB days.23
Overall, the pattern of intraday volume, spread and volatility are broadly consistent
with the abnormal activity reported in some of the earlier studies on circuit breakers (e.g.,
Lee et al., 1994; Corwin and Lipson, 2000). However, the mechanism behind is different:
SSCBs are not triggered by material news releases or order imbalances as it was the case
in those studies. Thus, we conjecture that even in the absence of the information channel,
the activity of a certain type of market participants, namely arbitrageurs in the market,
affects the trading dynamics of other stocks through their speculative strategies, in particular
during market disruptions. In the next section, we explore different types of (risky) arbitrage
strategies, and test whether the speculative activity of the arbitrageurs causes cross-sectional
liquidity and volatility spillover during the trading halts.
4 Non-halted stocks
An important, yet less studied, aspect of circuit breakers is the implication of such a
trading friction on overall market stability. In this section, we explore the repercussions
22The matching is conducted based on the average closing price and market capitalization one month
before the SSCB event.
23In Appendix Table A.3, we also show the diff-in-diff results at the event level.
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of circuit breakers on other related stocks that continue trading during the SSCB trading
halt. Specifically, we test whether price dynamics, liquidity and volatility measures of related
non-halted stocks are affected via risky arbitrage activity by the SSCB triggers, and subse-
quent trading halts. The related non-halted stocks are identified via two types of arbitrage
strategies explained in Section 2.2: momentum stocks (unanchored) and pairs trading stocks
(anchored) with and without industry matching. We use the above mentioned abnormal
market quality measures relative to the 30-day benchmark around the SSCB day.
In order to examine the dynamic response of non-halted stocks to SSCB events, we
provide graphical evidence on the price dynamics (Figure 4), and on different dimensions of
market quality, that is, share volume (Figure 5), relative spread (Figure 6) and short-term
volatility (Figure 7), over a 40-minute observation window around the SSCB event. The total
40-minute observation window is divided into one-minute increments. For each one-minute
interval, we calculate the abnormal measure for each stock, and then compute the average
across all non-halted stocks within the same arbitrage category.
4.1 Price dynamics
In Figure 4, we plot the average price of each non-halted stock normalized at the price
that prevailed 20 minutes before the trading halt. The left (right) column shows the rallies
(crashes). Each row corresponds to a set of non-halted stocks identified with a different
arbitrage strategy. The gray shaded area in the figures indicate the five-minute trading
halt. First of all, regardless of the arbitrage strategy, we note that the price of the non-
halted stocks react to the triggered of the SSCB. In the first row, we see that the price of
momentum stocks significantly increase during the trading halt, though the magnitude of
the price change is substantially lower compared to SSCB stocks. In the case of intraday
rallies, the prices stay at slightly higher levels even after the trading halt, similar to the
observation we made for SSCB stocks. On the contrary, in the case of intraday crashes,
prices immediately revert back to the pre-halt levels. For pairs trading stocks, the figures
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are very similar to the ones of the momentum stocks during intraday crashes, regardless
of the industry matching. However, we note that intraday rallies do not cause significant
price changes (wide confidence bands) for non-halted pairs trading stocks without industry
matching. On the other hand, the price jump is significant for the pairs trading stocks in
the same industry, hinting at the importance of destabilizing effect of arbitrage activity via
industry channel, even for anchored strategies.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4.2 Market quality
We next look at how share volume, relative spread and volatility of non-halted stocks are
evolve around the SSCBs. If the destabilizing trading activity of the arbitrageurs cause
spillover effects, as we conjecture, then we should observe abnormal trading activity on
SSCB days around the trading halts (the gray shaded in the figures below).
4.2.1 Volume
Figure 5 shows the abnormal share volume of the non-halted stocks identified through
different arbitrage strategies. Regardless of the type of arbitrage strategy, we note that
share volume significantly jumps (above 50%) just before the trading halt, and gradually
decreases during the halt with another significant jump when trading resumes after the halt.
Compared to anchored pairs trading strategies, the decline in trading volume is more gradual
in the case of momentum stocks with abnormally high volume even several minutes after the
halt which eventually reverts back to the normal level.
[Figure 5 about here.]
4.2.2 Liquidity
Figure 6 which shows the abnormal relative spread of the non-halted stocks draws a
different picture. In none of the panels, the illiquidity is abnormally high before the halt,
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ruling out any market-wide liquidity shock as the trigger of the trading halts. The liquidity
of momentum stocks is unaffected both during and after the halt. However, we do see
a significant increase in relative spreads of pairs trading stocks (both with and without
industry matching). There is only a temporary jump in illiquidity after trading resumes,
which reverts back to the normal level two minutes after the halt.
[Figure 6 about here.]
4.2.3 Volatility
Figure 7 reveals that the short-term volatility of the momentum stocks starts increasing
gradually in the last five minutes before the halt with a significant jump (around 40%) in the
last minute, and it remains at high levels during the halt with some decline towards the end
of suspension. The volatility jumps again once trading resumes and declines only gradually
to normal levels. In the case of anchored strategies, we do not observe a clear pattern in
volatility before the halt, but the volatility remains at high levels during the halt, with a
significant jump (more than 50%) right after the SSCB trigger in the case of pairs trading
with industry matching. While trading resumes at high levels of volatility, it reverts back to
normal relatively fast.
[Figure 7 about here.]
4.3 Difference-in-differences
The graphical evidence in the previous section shows that the market quality measures are
abnormally high during the SSCB trading halt for the non-halted stocks identified through
different arbitrage strategies. The results reported in Panel A of Table 3 confirm this evidence
for a larger set of market quality measures. We note that regardless of the arbitrage strategy
used to identify the non-halted stocks, trading activity, volume and volatility significantly
increase for non-halted stocks. We also observe an increase in illiquidity of non-halted
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(around 5% overall) during the halt, however the change is not significant for momentum
stocks. We also do not observe any significant change in the OTR measure of non-halted
stocks, a proxy for AT, once we focus on strong candidates for arbitrage activity.
[Table 3 about here.]
In order to pin down the channel for the cross-sectional spillover effects during the
SSCB halts, we conduct a difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) test using a matched sample
of stocks that are not candidates of any arbitrage strategy we consider in relation to the
SSCB stocks. In particular, following Davies and Kim (2009), we match each non-halted
stock one-to-one to a control stock based on share price and market capitalization. For
example, in the case of momentum stocks, we choose control stocks among the S&P500 and
Russell 1000 index firms which have no significant partial correlation (after controlling for
three FF risk factors) both with the SSCB and momentum stock, and are matched to each
momentum stock one-to-one based on price and market capitalization. For the control group
of pairs trading stocks, we sort candidate stocks based on the distance of price paths, and
consider the bottom 500 stocks with the maximum distance to the SSCB stocks, that is,
the least likely candidates for pairs trading. Using the same two characteristics, price and
market capitalization, we match each pairs trading stock one-to-one to a control stock. We
follow the same strategy for pairs trading stocks within the same industry, imposing the
constraint that the control stock belong to the same 2-digit SIC code of the SSCB stock.24
We report the results of the diff-in-diff tests in Panel B of Table 3 for each arbitrage
strategy. The last column also shows the pooled results. The evidence clearly shows that the
speculative activity of the arbitrageurs in the market is an important channel in transmitting
volume and volatility increases to other non-halted stocks. Incidentally both increase around
14% above the 30-day benchmark during the halt compared to the control sample. However,
24Imposing the industry constraint on the control group reduces substantially the number of potential
matches as a control. Therefore, some stocks in the control group still can be weak candidates for pairs
trading.
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there is no significant change in illiquidity of non-halted stocks, except for pairs trading
stocks, once the control sample is taken into account.25
In Table 4 we show the diff-in-diff results for different categories of SSCB events. In
Panel A, we compare intraday rallies with crashes, and events with non-material news versus
events with no news. We note that trading activity and volatility of non-halted stocks
significantly increase both for intraday rallies and crashes, with no significant change in
spread measures. On the other hand, we observe that the spillover in trading volume and
volatility is particularly strong when there is news on SSCB days. Interestingly, the only case
with significant increase in spreads is when there is no news associated with SSCB events,
e.g., fat finger trades or other technical problems. Next, we sort the non-halted stock based on
two firm characteristics, share price and market capitalization, and report the results for top
and bottom quintiles. We note that volume and volatility spillover effects do not primarily
come from extreme price quintiles, yet the liquidity of lower price stocks are significantly
affected by SSCB trading halts. However, volatility spillovers mainly concentrate around
larger stocks.
[Table 4 about here.]
Next, we run a panel regression to see how firm and event characteristics affect the
diff-in-diff results shown in previous tables. The dependent variables are share volume,
relative spread and short-term volatility. As control variables we include share price, market
capitalization, primary exchange of both SSCB and non-halted stocks, momentum, a dummy
variable indicating whether the non-halted stock is part of momentum strategy, pairs trading,
a dummy variable indicating whether the non-halted stock is part of pairs trading strategy,
and industry, a dummy variable equal to one if both SSCB and correlated stocks are in the
same 4-digit SIC industry. We also control for the following characteristics of the SSCB
events: rally a dummy variable equal to one if it is an intraday rally, news, dummy variable
equal to one if there is non-material news found on Factiva on the SSCB day, disc, a dummy
25Graphical evidence provided in Appendix Figure A.2 confirm these findings.
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variable equal to one if the circuit breaker is triggered by a discrete jump, weekday, week
day of the SSCB event, time, time (in seconds) of the SSCB trigger relative to 9.45am, the
level of the VIX index on the SSCB day, and the abnormal VIX measured as the VIX level
on the SSCB day relative to the average VIX level in the SSCB month.
[Table 5 about here.]
Table 5 shows that most of the firm and event characteristics due not explain the
differences between the abnormal trading activity of non-halted stocks relative the matched
control sample during the trading halt. In line with the evidence in Panel B of Table 3, the
volume effect is particularly strong for the momentum stocks, that is, those stocks which are
part of an unanchored risky arbitrage strategy (Stein, 2009). The absence of any news on
the SSCB implies a higher abnormal spread for non-halted stocks during halt. This result,
also confirmed in Panel A of Table 3, suggests the lack of any firm-specific news on the day
of the SSCB creates uncertainty, and hence causes illiquidity for other non-halted stocks in
the arbitrage portfolio. None of the controls considered in the table explain the volatility
spillover to non-halted stocks. Most importantly, neither the VIX level nor the abnormal
measure of VIX, is significant in the regression. This result lends strong support for the
idiosyncratic nature of the SSCB events. Overall, the table confirms our initial conjecture
that the arbitrage channel is the major driving force behind the cross-sectional spillovers to
non-halted stocks.
5 Conclusion
This is one of the first studies that analyses a set of intraday rally and crash events at
the firm level during the SEC initiated single stock circuit breaker (SSCB) program. These
intraday events that are unrelated to material news release by the firm or other market-wide
information shocks, provide an ideal setting to analyze the effects of circuit breakers to other
non-halted stocks beyond the information channel. Our identification of related non-halted
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stocks through the arbitrage channel differentiates our study from other papers, and helps us
test the effects of such trading interventions on other related stocks in the context of market
quality beyond price efficiency.
Our results show that the circuit breakers not only interrupt the trading activity of
halted stocks but also affect the volume and volatility of other related non-halted stocks
through the speculative trading strategies of arbitrageurs. Our evidence on the role of
arbitrageurs for cross-sectional spillovers during market disruptions is highly relevant for the
revived discussion on the introduction of transaction (Tobin) tax in the securities markets
to limit speculation. Yet, our analysis solely focuses on the behavior of a subset of market
participants in a stylized setting, namely arbitrageurs who take risk following speculative
trading strategies such as momentum or pairs trading. It would be interesting to look at the
interaction of different type of market participants, say, arbitrageurs versus (high frequency)
liquidity suppliers identified using direct measures such as HFT flags, to have a complete
picture on cross-sectional spillovers.
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Figure 1: SSCB events
The figure shows the SSCB events over the SEC pilot period between June 2010 and April 2013.
The x-axis is the time of the SSCB event. The y-axis shows the price of individual SSCB stocks.
The vertical lines shows the three phases of the pilot program: Phase I from 11 June 2010 until
13 September 2010 which includes only S&P 500 stocks, Phase II: from 14 September 2010 until
7 August 2011 which also includes Russell 1000 firms, and Phase III from 8 August 2011 until
the start of the Limit up limit down regulation on 8 April 2013. The last phase includes all NMS
stocks.
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Figure 2: Speed of price adjustment on SSCB days: SSCB stocks
(a)
(b)
The figures show how the price of SSCB stocks evolves 40 minutes around the trading halt. The
x-axis represents the time (in minutes) relative to the SSCB event. The y-axis shows the price
ratio, that is the stock price in each minute relative to the price 20 minutes before the start of the
trading halt. Panel A (Panel B) shows the average price of intraday rallies (crashes). The solid
line with asterisks (95% confidence interval) exhibits the events with no news on the SSCB day
while the dashed line with filled circles (95% confidence interval) represent the events with related
news found in Factiva on the SSCB day. The halt label in the x-axis refers to the last one-minute
interval before the circuit breaker. The reopen is defined as the first one-minute interval after the
restart of trading.
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Figure 3: Market quality on SSCB days: SSCB stocks
(a)
(b)
(c)
These figures show the abnormal market quality measures of SSCB stocks, that is, volume (Panel
A), relative spread (Panel B) and volatility (Panel C) measured on SSCB days relative to the 30-
day average around the SSCB day (excluding the SSCB day), 40 minutes around the trading halt.
The x-axis represents the time (in minutes) relative to the SSCB event. Volume is calculated as
the total trading volume in shares. Volatility is defined as the highest midquote in a one-minute
interval minus the lowest midquote in the same interval, divided by the highest midquote. Relative
spread is the time-weighted average of the ask price minus bid price over the midquote in a one-
minute interval. The solid line with asterisks (95% confidence interval) exhibits the events with no
news (N=20) on the SSCB day while the dashed line with filled circles (95% confidence interval)
represent the events with related news (N=34) found in Factiva on the SSCB day.
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Figure 4: Speed of price adjustment around SSCB: Non-halted stocks
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
These figures show how the price of related non-halted stocks evolves 40 minutes around the trading
halt. The x-axis represents the time (in minutes) relative to the SSCB event. The y-axis shows the
price ratio, that is the stock price in each minute relative to the price 20 minutes before the start
of the trading halt. The first (second) column shows the average price of intraday rallies, N=195
(crashes, N=75). Panel A and B show the speed of price adjustment for the candidate stocks of a
momentum strategy. Panel C and D show the speed of price adjustment for the candidate stocks
of a pairs trading strategy. Panel E and F show the speed of price adjustment for the candidate
stocks (within the same broad industry category with the SSCB stocks) of a pairs trading strategy.
The asterisks indicate 95% confidence interval. The gray shaded area indicates the trading halt.
31
Figure 5: Share volume on SSCB days: Non-halted stocks
(a)
(b)
(c)
These figures show the abnormal share volume of related non-halted stocks, that is, momentum
stocks (Panel A), pairs trading stocks (Panel B) and pairs trading (industry) stocks (Panel C).
Share volume is measured on SSCB days relative to the 30-day average around the SSCB day
(excluding the SSCB day), 40 minutes around the trading halt. The x-axis represents the time (in
minutes) relative to the SSCB event. Volume is calculated as the total trading volume in shares
in a one-minute interval. The asterisks indicate 95% confidence interval. The gray shaded area
indicates the trading halt.
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Figure 6: Relative spread on SSCB days: Non-halted stocks
(a)
(b)
(c)
These figures show the abnormal relative spread of related non-halted stocks, that is, momentum
stocks (Panel A), pairs trading stocks (Panel B) and pairs trading (industry) stocks (Panel C).
Share volume is measured on SSCB days relative to the 30-day average around the SSCB day
(excluding the SSCB day), 40 minutes around the trading halt. The x-axis represents the time (in
minutes) relative to the SSCB event. Relative spread is the time-weighted average of the ask price
minus bid price over the midquote in a one-minute interval. The asterisks indicate 95% confidence
interval. The gray shaded area indicates the trading halt.
33
Figure 7: Volatility on SSCB days: Non-halted stocks
(a)
(b)
(c)
These figures show the abnormal share volume of related non-halted stocks, that is, momentum
stocks (Panel A), pairs trading stocks (Panel B) and pairs trading (industry) stocks (Panel C).
Volatility is measured on SSCB days relative to the 30-day average around the SSCB day (excluding
the SSCB day), 40 minutes around the trading halt. The x-axis represents the time (in minutes)
relative to the SSCB event. Volatility is defined as the highest midquote in a one-minute interval
minus the lowest midquote in the same interval, divided by the highest midquote. The asterisks
indicate 95% confidence interval. The gray shaded area indicates the trading halt.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for SSCB and non-halted stocks
This table provides the summary statistics for 54 SSCB stocks and 740 related non-halted
stocks. Non-halted stocks are identified as candidate stocks that are part of an arbitrage
strategy which involves SSCB stocks. We consider momentum trading, pairs trading and
pairs trading within the same industry sector. The last column reports the pooled results
(with non-overlapping observations) across different arbitrage strategies.
SSCB
stocks
Momentum
stocks
Pairs trading
stocks
Pairs trading
stocks
(same industry)
All
non-halted
stocks
Number of observations
Jun 2010 - Dec 2010 9 45 45 45 119
Jan 2011 - Dec 2011 26 130 125 125 359
Jan 2012 - Dec 2012 14 70 65 65 193
Jan 2013 - Mar 2013 5 25 25 25 69
Jump direction
Rally 35 175 165 165 544
Crash 19 95 95 95 196
News
Non-material news 34 170 160 160 457
No news 20 100 100 100 283
Jump type
Discrete jump 17 85 85 85 233
Cumulative jump 37 185 175 175 507
Price ($)
Mean 52.00 47.12 29.21 26.62 33.87
Median 26.86 37.20 18.60 19.59 24.98
Max 596.05 528.94 457.01 309.70 528.94
Min 1.54 1.70 0.15 0.23 0.15
Market cap ($billion)
Mean 39.36 12.99 8.08 8.99 9.96
Median 4.06 6.35 1.32 1.25 2.59
Max 555.74 201.09 268.59 238.08 268.59
Min 0.40 0.79 0.005 0.005 0.005
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Table 2: Trading activity on SSCB days: SSCB stocks
The table presents the average abnormal market quality measures for SSCB stocks (N =54).
In Panel A, for each SSCB stock, we compute the percentage change of each measure relative
to the 30-day benchmark in a 5-minute and a 20-minute (excluding the 5-minute around the
halt) window around the halt. Quoted, effective and relative spreads are time weighted
averages, while the number of trades, the number of quotes, share and dollar volume are
aggregated over the observation window. We calculate the benchmark measures of the same
intraday period for 30 days around the SSCB day, excluding the day of SSCB. Panel B shows
the results of a diff-in-diff analysis using a control group matched based on price and market
capitalization within the same index, that is, S&P or Russell 1000. We conduct a two-sided
t-test to evaluate the significance of the difference between SSCB day and the benchmark
period. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
Panel A. Abnormal market quality measures
Variables [-5 min, Halt] [Reopen, 5 min] [-20 min, -6 min] [6 min, 20 min]
Number of trades 21.628*** 25.669*** 2.921*** 10.862***
Number of quotes 8.548*** 8.198*** 1.461*** 5.187***
Share volume 29.567*** 38.795*** 3.387*** 15.137***
Dollar volume 30.268*** 40.384*** 3.536*** 15.957***
Quoted spread 0.395*** 1.524*** 0.062*** 0.704***
Relative spread 1.265*** 2.556*** 0.416** 1.235***
Effective spread 0.394*** 1.416*** 0.054** 0.634***
Volatility 10.017*** 12.670*** 1.250*** 5.789***
OTR -0.323*** -0.601*** -0.110*** -0.478***
Panel B. Market quality measures (diff-in-diff)
Variables [-5 min, Halt] [Reopen, 5 min] [-20 min, -6 min] [6 min, 20 min]
Number of trades 21.402*** 25.283*** 2.883*** 10.815***
Number of quotes 8.486*** 8.127*** 1.490*** 5.202***
Share volume 29.308*** 38.306*** 3.226*** 14.973***
Dollar volume 30.060*** 39.954*** 3.435*** 15.841***
Quoted spread 0.419*** 1.489*** 0.068** 0.706***
Relative spread 1.319*** 2.143*** 0.203 0.600***
Effective spread 0.379*** 1.343*** 0.018 0.805***
Volatility 9.976*** 12.264*** 1.065*** 5.464***
OTR -0.394*** -0.594*** -0.171** -0.376***
36
Table 3: Trading activity on SSCB days: Non-halted stocks
The table presents the average of abnormal measures during the trading halt for non-halted
stocks related to 54 SSCB stocks. In Panel A, for each non-halted stock identified through
three different arbitrage strategies, we present the percentage change for each measure
for the halt period of the circuit breaker relative to 30-day the benchmark around the
SSCB day. The last column shows the results aggregated over all arbitrage strategies
(non-overlapping observations). Quoted, effective and relative spreads are time weighted
averages, while the number of trades, the number of quotes, share and dollar volume are
aggregated over the observation window. Panel B shows the results of a diff-in-diff analysis
using a control group matched based on price and market capitalization. We conduct a
two-sided t-test to evaluate the significance. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Panel A. Abnormal market quality measures
Variables
Momentum
stocks
(N=270)
Pairs trading
stocks
(N=260)
Pairs trading
stocks (same industry)
(N=260)
All
non-halted stocks
(N=740)
Number of trades 0.241*** 0.161*** 0.247*** 0.175***
Number of quotes 0.220*** 0.109*** 0.193*** 0.156***
Share volume 0.331*** 0.314*** 0.356*** 0.275***
Dollar volume 0.325*** 0.311*** 0.365*** 0.272***
Quoted Spread 0.010 0.055*** 0.082*** 0.044***
Relative spread 0.018 0.058*** 0.081*** 0.048***
Effective spread 0.022 0.103* 0.135** 0.080**
Volatility 0.280*** 0.246*** 0.328*** 0.248***
OTR -0.023 -0.007 -0.039 -0.018
Panel B. Market quality measures (diff-in-diff)
Variables
Momentum
stocks
(N=270)
Pairs trading
stocks
(N=260)
Pairs trading
stocks (same industry)
(N=250)
All
non-halted stocks
(N=730)
Number of trades 0.246*** 0.112*** 0.017 0.128***
Number of quotes 0.166*** 0.134*** 0.020 0.103***
Share volume 0.303*** 0.172* -0.047 0.141***
Dollar volume 0.306*** 0.171* -0.046 0.142***
Quoted Spread -0.022 0.059*** 0.073 0.018
Relative spread -0.019 0.056** 0.070** 0.018
Effective spread -0.130 0.212** -0.012** -0.023
Volatility 0.170** 0.161* 0.186* 0.140***
OTR -0.032 0.017 -0.026 -0.012
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Table 4: Trading activity on SSCB days: Non-halted stocks (categories)
The table presents the results of a diff-in-diff analysis using a control group matched based
on price and market capitalization for different event categories. In Panel A we split the
pooled sample of non-halted stocks by event type, namely, intraday rallies versus crashes,
and SSCB event with non-material news on Factiva versus SSCB events with no news. In
Panel B, we split the pooled sample of non-halted stocks based on two characteristics, price
and market capitalization. We report the results for the top and bottom quintiles. We
conduct a two-sided t-test to evaluate the significance. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Panel A. Market quality measures: type of event (diff-in-diff)
Variables
Rally
(N=544)
Crash
(N=196)
News
(N=457)
No news
(N=283)
Number of trades 0.098** 0.196** 0.144*** 0.105
Number of quotes 0.072** 0.179*** 0.120*** 0.078*
Share volume 0.119** 0.191* 0.171*** 0.097
Dollar volume 0.115** 0.204** 0.177*** 0.089
Quoted spread 0.018 0.019 -0.012 0.066***
Relative spread 0.019 0.016 -0.014 0.067***
Effective spread -0.045 0.027 -0.043 0.007
Volatility 0.124** 0.178* 0.158*** 0.115
OTR 0.001 -0.043 -0.002 -0.025
Panel B. Market quality measures: price and market cap quintiles (diff-in-diff)
Variables
Bottom quintile
price (N=158)
Top quintile
price (N=158)
Bottom quintile
mkt cap (N=158)
Top quintile
mkt cap (N=158)
Number of trades 0.110 0.086* 0.207 0.153***
Number of quotes 0.143** 0.057* 0.166* 0.130***
Share volume 0.087 0.070 0.145 0.118*
Dollar volume 0.082 0.091 0.138 0.130*
Quoted spread 0.043* 0.023 0.032 0.019
Relative spread 0.045** 0.017 0.035 0.017
Effective spread 0.024 0.023 -0.287 0.016
Volatility -0.008 0.139* -0.166 0.215***
OTR -0.027 -0.003 -0.014 -0.007
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Table 5: Trading activity during the halt (diff-in-diff): Controls
The table shows the diff-in-diff results of the trading activity during the trading halt controlling
for stock and SSCB event characteristics. The dependent variables are the share volume, relative
spread and volatility. As controls we include share price, market capitalization, primary exchange
of both SSCB and non halted stocks, industry, a dummy variable equal to one if both SSCB and
non-halted stocks are in the same 4-digit SIC industry category, momentum, a dummy variable
indicating whether the non-halted stock is part of momentum strategy and pairs trading, a dummy
variable indicating whether the non-halted stock is part of pairs trading strategy. We also control
for the following characteristics of the SSCB events: rally a dummy equal to 1 if it is an intraday
rally, news, dummy variable equal to one if there is non-material news found on Factiva on SSCB
day, disc, a dummy variable equal to one if the circuit breaker is triggered by a discrete jump,
weekday, week day of the SSCB event, time, time (in seconds) of the SSCB trigger relative to
9.45am, and the level of the VIX index on the SSCB day and the abnormal VIX measured as
the VIX level on the SSCB day relative to the average VIX level in the SSCB month. We report
p-values in parentheses. Errors are clustered at the SSCB event level.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables V olumehaltnh Relative spread
halt
nh V olatility
halt
nh
Pricenh 0.059 0.002 0.033
(0.689) (0.950) (0.712)
Mktcapnh -0.091 0.024 -0.035
(0.120) (0.175) (0.580)
Exchnh 0.129 -0.075* 0.194
(0.423) (0.083) (0.223)
Pricesscb 0.001 0.009 -0.028
(0.994) (0.730) (0.784)
Mktcapsscb 0.033 -0.003 0.058
(0.688) (0.850) (0.446)
Exchsscb 0.198 -0.002 -0.251
(0.185) (0.973) (0.212)
Momentum 0.570** -0.077 0.010
(0.012) (0.226) (0.957)
Pairs trading 0.271 0.054 -0.101
(0.227) (0.390) (0.648)
Industry 0.628* 0.026 0.202
(0.089) (0.736) (0.469)
Rally 0.076 0.074 -0.092
(0.756) (0.329) (0.697)
News 0.215 -0.119** 0.187
(0.314) (0.041) (0.460)
Disc -0.018 -0.041 0.090
(0.938) (0.594) (0.760)
Weekday -0.059 0.005 -0.079
(0.506) (0.751) (0.299)
Time -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.913) (0.689) (0.775)
VIX -0.007 0.002 -0.008
(0.642) (0.595) (0.634)
Abnormal VIX 1.123 -0.261 0.689
(0.383) (0.595) (0.634)
Intercept -1.180 0.139 0.436
(0.548) (0.778) (0.783)
Observations 740 740 740
Adj. R2 0.016 -0.014 0.006
Cluster error yes yes yes
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6 Appendix
Table A.1: SSCB stocks
This table lists the company ticker, name, the industry sector (according to the 2-digit SIC code),
the index, S&P 500 versus Russell 1000, the primary exchange, NYSE versus Nasdaq, the share
price and market capitalization on the SSCB day for a sample of 54 SSCB events at the firm level
during the period between June 2010 and April 2013.
Ticker Name Industry Index Exchange Price Mktcap($million)
WPO Washington Post Printing & Publishing S&P 500 NYSE 458.19 3,623.37
C Citigroup Depository Institutions S&P 500 NYSE 3.73 108,094.95
APC Anadarko Petroleum Oil & Gas Extraction S&P 500 NYSE 38.64 19,116.91
CSCO Cisco Systems Electronic & Other Electric Equipment S&P 500 Nasdaq 23.21 132,555.81
MU Micron Technology Electronic & Other Electric Equipment S&P 500 Nasdaq 7.70 7,655.12
NUE Nucor Corporation Primary Metal Industries Russell 1000 NYSE 39.41 12,436.26
PGN Progress Energy Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services Russell 1000 NYSE 44.43 12,999.37
ADBE Adobe Systems Business Services S&P 500 Nasdaq 28.69 14,595.09
GAS Nicor Gas Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services Russell 1000 NYSE 46.63 2,123.25
ATHR Atheros Communication Electronic & Other Electric Equipment Russell 1000 Nasdaq 44.00 3,247.86
MBI MBIA Insurance Carriers Russell 1000 NYSE 13.53 2,704.08
GMCR Green Mountain Food & Kindred Products Russell 1000 Nasdaq 46.35 6,563.21
M Macy’s General Merchandise Stores S&P 500 NYSE 25.40 10,815.47
REGN Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Chemical & Allied Products Russell 1000 Nasdaq 67.05 5,949.95
RAH Ralcorp Holdings Printing & Publishing Russell 1000 NYSE 77.80 4,227.37
MA Mastercard Business Services S&P 500 NYSE 309.70 37,369.95
V Visa Business Services S&P 500 NYSE 86.50 45,296.80
KCI Kinetic Concepts Instruments & Related Products Russell 1000 NYSE 66.20 4,811.55
MBI MBIA Insurance Carriers Russell 1000 NYSE 10.02 2,001.79
XOM ExxonMobil Petroleum & Coal Products S&P 500 NYSE 71.58 348,021.97
MBI MBIA Insurance Carriers Russell 1000 NYSE 6.90 1,378.48
LINTA Liberty Media Printing & Publishing Russell 1000 Nasdaq 16.77 9,603.88
CLWR Clearwire Communications Russell 1000 Nasdaq 2.50 621.26
CLWR Clearwire Communications Russell 1000 Nasdaq 2.41 598.89
BPOP Popular Electronic Other Electric Equipment Russell 1000 Nasdaq 1.54 1,577.17
CLWR Clearwire Communications Russell 1000 Nasdaq 2.15 536.87
CSE Capitalsource Nondepository Institutions Russell 1000 NYSE 6.23 2,011.02
S Sprint Nextel Communications Russell 1000 NYSE 2.41 7,209.99
CLWR Clearwire Communications Russell 1000 Nasdaq 1.59 397.03
AMR AMR Corporation Transportation by Air Russell 1000 NYSE 2.76 925.17
WLT Walter Energy Coal Mining Russell 1000 NYSE 71.98 4,492.92
DNDN Dendreon Corporation Chemical & Allied Products Russell 1000 Nasdaq 7.51 1,118.67
WFR MEMC Electronic Electronic & Other Electric Equipment Russell 1000 NYSE 4.20 967.96
CEG Constellation Energy Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services Russell 1000 NYSE 39.60 7,981.93
SD Sandridge Energy Oil & Gas Extraction Russell 1000 NYSE 8.21 3,383.34
BKU Bankunited Depository Institutions Russell 1000 NYSE 24.48 2,381.51
AAPL Apple Industrial Machinery & Equipment S&P 500 Nasdaq 596.04 555,739.13
DAL Delta Air Lines Transportation by Air Russell 1000 NYSE 11.43 9,711.37
BAH Booz Allen Engineering & Management Services Russell 1000 NYSE 16.76 2,153.58
DNB Dun & Bradstreet Business Services S&P 500 NYSE 80.19 3838.21
KRO Kronos Worldwide Chemical & Allied Products Russell 1000 NYSE 18.00 2,086.124
TRN Trinity Indutries Transportation Equipment Russell 1000 NYSE 28.32 2,237.34
ANF Abercrombie & Fitch Apparel & Accessory Stores Russell 1000 NYSE 37.92 3130.94
MDRX Allscripts Healthcare Solutions Business Services Russell 1000 Nasdaq 12.42 2,129.56
GDI Gardner Denver Industrial Machinery & Equipment Russell 1000 NYSE 66.00 3,232.22
VRSN Verisign Business Services S&P 500 Nasdaq 41.15 6,389.17
BMRN Biomarin Pharmaceuticals Chemical & Allied Products Russell 1000 Nasdaq 47.60 5,894.33
WLL Whiting Petroleum Oil & Gas Extraction Russell 1000 NYSE 40.94 4,815.81
CPWR Compuware corporation Business Services Russell 1000 Nasdaq 10.76 2,294.52
DELL Dell Industrial Machinery & Equipment S&P 500 Nasdaq 12.29 21,351.07
ENDP Endo Pharmaceuticals Chemical & Allied Products Russell 1000 Nasdaq 31.66 3,507.74
MBI MBIA Insurance Carriers Russell 1000 NYSE 12.78 2,463.38
CHTR Charter Communications Communications Russell 1000 Nasdaq 98.04 9,919.59
MXIM Maxim Integrated Products Electronic & Other Electric Equipment Russell 1000 Nasdaq 32.15 9,403.17
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Table A.2: SSCB events
This table reports detailed information on the 54 SSCB events during the period between June 2010
and April 2013. The date, time and day show the SSCB date, start of the trading halt, and the
weekday when the SSCB is triggered. The table also presents the following characteristics of the
SSCB events: disc, a dummy variable equal to one if the circuit breaker is triggered by a discrete
jump, rallies, indicating the sign of the jump, news, a dummy variable equal to one if the circuit
breaker is associated with firm-specific non-material news, zero otherwise, and details of Factiva
search lists the corresponding detailed news information found in Factiva on the event day. The
abnormal VIX is the ratio of the VIX index on the day of the SSCB relative to the average index
level in the SSCB event month.
Ticker Date Time Day Discrete Rally Abnormal VIX News Details of Factiva Search
WPO 16 Jun 2010 15:07:30 Wed 1 1 0.909 0 Erroneous trade (Reuters)
C 29 Jun 2010 13:03:51 Tue 1 0 1.095 0 Erroneous report (Bloomberg)
APC 06 Jul 2010 10:56:26 Wed 1 1 1.103 0 Erroneous trade at $99,999.09 (WSJ)
CSCO 29 Jul 2010 10:41:33 Thu 1 1 0.890 0 Erroneous trade (Reuters)
MU 05 Aug 2010 10:14:30 Thu 1 0 0.962 0 No specific news
NUE 14 Sep 2010 11:52:21 Tue 1 0 0.983 0 Liquidity related, penny trades at $0.01
PGN 27 Sep 2010 12:57:42 Mon 1 0 0.932 0 Typo in sell order
ADBE 07 Oct 2010 15:08:03 Thu 1 1 1.113 1 Microsoft merger talk
GAS 02 Dec 2010 14:34:09 Thu 0 1 1.113 1 Firm hired JPMorgan to seek a buyer (Bloomberg)
ATHR 04 Jan 2011 15:00:56 Tue 0 1 1.101 1 Qualcomm is near a deal talk to buy the company
MBI 11 Jan 2011 11:48:22 Tue 0 1 1.054 1 The company won an important ruling
GMCR 14 Feb 2011 15:16:23 Mon 0 1 0.932 1 Partnership talk with Starbucks
M 07 Apr 2011 11:31:54 Thu 1 0 1.063 0 Nine canceled trades
REGN 27 Apr 2011 13:16:50 Wed 0 1 0.888 1 Reports published with positive results on cancer drug
RAH 29 Apr 2011 12:36:26 Fri 0 1 0.873 1 Rumors of an unsolicited bid
MA 29 Jun 2011 15:13:05 Wed 0 1 0.931 1 Fed debit card fee raise proposal
V 29 Jun 2011 15:12:53 Wed 0 1 0.931 1 Fed debit card fee raise proposal
KCI 06 Jul 2011 10:09:13 Wed 0 1 0.944 1 Rumors about talk with private equity firms
MBI 14 Jul 2011 15:20:01 Thu 0 1 1.062 1 BAC preliminary offer to settle lawsuits (Bloomberg)
XOM 11 Aug 2011 10:33:59 Thu 1 0 0.941 0 Bad trade (CNBC)
MBI 25 Aug 2011 15:11:53 Thu 0 1 1.183 1 5-year Credit Default Swap tightened 47.55 basis points
LINTA 21 Sep 2011 14:47:26 Wed 0 1 1.024 1 Delaware Supreme Court has affirmed a ruling
CLWR 22 Sep 2011 13:05:46 Thu 0 1 1.104 1 Cnet reports talks with AT&T about 4G LTE network
CLWR 23 Sep 2011 14:45:09 Fri 0 1 1.120 1 Firm eyes Verizon in network capacity talks (Reuters)
BPOP 27 Sep 2011 12:04:32 Tue 0 1 1.052 0 No specific news
CLWR 04 Oct 2011 10:18:01 Tue 0 1 1.169 0 No specific news
CSE 04 Oct 2011 12:12:28 Tue 1 1 1.169 0 No specific news
S 07 Oct 2011 11:52:56 Fri 0 0 1.103 1 Firm considers public markets to raise capital
CLWR 14 Oct 2011 15:15:13 Fri 0 1 0.900 1 Moody’s downgrade
AMR 17 Oct 2011 10:54:11 Mon 0 0 1.011 1 American Airlines fails to reach labor agreement
WLT 17 Oct 2011 15:31:30 Mon 1 0 1.011 1 BHP Billiton takeover rumors
DNDN 16 Nov 2011 13:08:31 Wed 0 1 1.037 1 Goldman Sachs conference call with urology experts
WFR 08 Dec 2011 09:47:57 Thu 1 1 1.138 1 Announcement of a series of actions for restructuring
CEG 21 Dec 2011 12:03:05 Wed 0 0 0.869 1 Bloomberg headline of block of acquisition
SD 22 Dec 2011 15:03:28 Thu 0 1 0.890 0 No specific news
BKU 13 Jan 2012 13:48:46 Fri 0 1 1.044 1 Media reports that the company is considering a sale
AAPL 23 Mar 2012 10:57:36 Fri 1 0 0.829 0 BATS technical problem
DAL 14 May 2012 10:39:25 Mon 1 0 0.987 0 Fat finger trade, seeking alpha website
BAH 11 Jul 2012 12:17:22 Wed 0 1 1.024 1 Firm is considering $1 bln special dividend
DNB 31 Jul 2012 14:49:02 Tue 0 1 0.996 1 News on working with banks to explore sale
KRO 01 Aug 2012 09:56:20 Wed 0 1 1.119 0 Knight capital technical glitch (Forbes)
TRN 01 Aug 2012 09:59:45 Wed 0 0 1.119 0 Knight capital technical glitch, (Forbes)
ANF 12 Sep 2012 13:58:38 Wed 0 1 1.008 1 Firm retains Goldman Sachs
MDRX 28 Sep 2012 12:43:52 Fri 0 1 0.939 1 Firm talks with private equity firms
GDI 25 Oct 2012 15:11:26 Thu 0 1 1.027 1 Firm asks Goldman Sachs to explore sale (Reuters)
VRSN 01 Nov 2012 14:03:02 Thu 0 1 1.023 1 Market talk about registry renewal agreement
BMRN 15 Nov 2012 09:50:45 Thu 1 1 1.080 0 No specific news
WLL 29 Nov 2012 14:38:30 Thu 0 0 0.872 1 Firm explored selling itself (WSJ Blog)
CPWR 17 Dec 2012 10:11:39 Mon 0 1 0.925 1 Cash buyout offer from Elliott Management
DELL 14 Jan 2013 14:04:13 Mon 0 1 1.030 1 Buyout talks private-equity firms (WSJ blog)
ENDP 30 Jan 2013 14:29:31 Wed 0 1 0.978 0 No specific news
MBI 04 Mar 2013 12:59:11 Mon 0 1 1.060 1 U.S. court dismisses bank lawsuit (Reuters)
CHTR 18 Mar 2013 12:42:13 Mon 0 1 1.030 0 No specific news
MXIM 27 Mar 2013 10:33:58 Wed 1 0 0.963 1 Researchers submit a patent application (Verticalnews)
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Figure A.1: Market quality on SSCB days: SSCB versus control stocks
(a)
(b)
(c)
These figures compare the abnormal market quality measures of SSCB stocks and control stocks,
that is, share volume (Panel A), relative spread (Panel B) and volatility (Panel C) measured on
SSCB days relative to the 30-day average around the SSCB day (excluding the SSCB day), 40
minutes around the trading halt. Control stocks are within same index, and matched based on
share price and market capitalization. The x-axis represents the time (in minutes) relative to the
SSCB event. Volume is calculated as the total trading volume in shares. Volatility is defined as the
highest midquote in a one-minute interval minus the lowest midquote in the same interval, divided
by the highest midquote. Relative spread is the time-weighted average of the ask price minus bid
price over the midquote in a one-minute interval. The black dashed line with filled circles (95%
confidence interval) exhibits the SSCB stocks while the gray solid line with circles (95% confidence
interval) represent the control stocks.
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Figure A.2: Market quality on SSCB days: Non-halted versus control stocks
(a)
(b)
(c)
These figures compare the abnormal market quality measures of all non-halted stocks and control
stocks, that is, share volume (Panel A), relative spread (Panel B) and volatility (Panel C) measured
on SSCB days relative to the 30-day average around the SSCB day (excluding the SSCB day), 40
minutes around the trading halt. Control stocks are matched based on share price and market
capitalization. The x-axis represents the time (in minutes) relative to the SSCB event. Volume
is calculated as the total trading volume in shares. Volatility is defined as the highest midquote
in a one-minute interval minus the lowest midquote in the same interval, divided by the highest
midquote. Relative spread is the time-weighted average of the ask price minus bid price over
the midquote in a one-minute interval. The black dashed line with filled circles (95% confidence
interval) exhibits all non-halted stocks while the gray solid line with circles (95% confidence interval)
represent the control stocks.
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